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NO IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
UNDER NEPA

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT: The Fifth Circuit holds that a private citizen suffering
economic injury due to rapid transit system's failure to adhere to its
environmental impact statement does not have a private right of action
under the National Environmental Policy Act. Noe v. Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid TransitAuthority, 644 F. 2d 434 (5th Cir. 1981).
The plaintiff in Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority'

owned a bookstore near the construction site of Atlanta's metropolitan
area rapid transit system (MARTA). Noe claimed that the physical presence of the construction site and the noise levels it generated resulted in
a loss to her business. Consequently, she filed suit against MARTA and
its builders in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief and money damages. The plaintiff asserted that MARTA and its
builders had violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)2
because they had failed to comply with the environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared for the project prior to construction. 3 She also claimed
that NEPA created an implied private right of action to enforce the statute.
The district court dismissed the suit for lack of federal jurisdiction on the
basis that NEPA did not require MARTA and its builders to adhere to
their own EIS. 4
Noe appealed to the Fifth Circuit court of appeals. She raised two
issues on appeal. First, she claimed that NEPA required MARTA to
comply with its own EIS. Second, she claimed that NEPA created an
1. 644 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1981).

2.42 U.S.C. §§4322-4361 (1976).

3. 42 U.S.C. §4332(c) (1976) requires that all agencies of the federal government shall " include
in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action .... "A state agency or official can
prepare an EIS for a federal action funded under a program of grants to a state if the state agency
has statewide jurisdiction and responsibility for the project and the responsible federal official
participates in and approves the preparation of the plan under 42 U.S.C. §4332(D)(i)(ii) and (iii)

(1976).
4. Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Sys., 485 F.Supp. 501, 504 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
The court reasoned that MARTA had met NEPA's "twin goals" of consideration of the environmental
effects of the construction and public knowledge of and participation in environmental decision
making.
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implied private cause of action for damages, declaratory, and injunctive
relief. To reach the issue of whether NEPA created a private cause of
action, the court assumed that MARTA was required to adhere to its own
EIS. The court held that NEPA did not create an implied private cause
of action, thereby affirming the trial court's dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit considered this issue within the context of the four
prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash5
to decide whether a federal statute creates an implied private cause of
action. The test consists of the following four inquiries:
(1) Is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose special benefit
the statute was created?
(2) Is there any indication of legislative intent either to create or
deny the remedy sought?
(3) Is it consistent with the underlying statutory purposes to imply
a remedy such as that sought?
(4) Is the cause of action one that is traditionally relegated to state
law, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?6
Noe argued that all four factors needed to be considered to determine
whether she had an implied private right of action under NEPA. The
court, however, disagreed, concluding that the analysis in Cort was no
longer the law. The Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had shifted
the analysis in decisions subsequent to Cort to require a showing of
legislative intent to create a private right of action before considering the
remaining three criteria; Cort required a plaintiff to show merely that a
federal statute granted certain rights to his or her class. In Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington,7 the Supreme Court limited its inquiry to whether
Congress had manifested an intent to create an implied private right of
action under the statute involved. Similarly, in TransamericaMortgage
Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis,8 the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could
not bring suit because it had not shown legislative intent to create an
implied cause of action. Based on this case development, the Fifth Circuit
held that Noe had failed to show legislative intent to create a private right
of action under NEPA and therefore could not maintain her cause of
action.
5. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
6. Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 644 F.2d 434, 436 (5th Cir. 1981).
7. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 560 (1979).
8. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). The plaintiff in Lewis was within the class Congress intended to benefit
as required under the first Cort criterion, but that was immaterial to the Court's decision to deny
plaintiff's claim.
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Although it had determined that application of the four pronged Cort
test was no longer necessary, the court nonetheless considered Noe's
claims in light of all four Cort criteria and found that she failed under
the remaining standards. Initially, Noe claimed that she fell within the
class of citizens the act intended to benefit because NEPA required MARTA
to prepare an EIS covering the construction which produced the injury
to her business. The Fifth Circuit responded that the alleged violation
had merely injured Noe incidentally and that her injury was not of the
type NEPA legislation protected. Congress intended to prevent uninformed decision making by enacting NEPA. The act "was designed to
promote the protection of the environment and to the extent it was intended
to aid individuals, to promote the general welfare of all members of
society.-"
Under the second Cort criterion, Noe argued that Cort and Cannon v.
University of Chicago"° did not require her to show congressional intent
to create the remedy sought, but only to show that the statute had granted
a class of persons a certain right. The Fifth Circuit found again that Lewis
requires a determination that Congress intended to create a private right
of action under NEPA before considering whether Congress had granted
Noe's class a certain right.
The court also found that the protection Congress provided under NEPA
did not include a remedy for a private citizen injured by a NEPA violation.
The Fifth Circuit instead discerned a specific congressional desire evidenced by the legislative history not to create a private right of action.
The Senate version of the NEPA bill stated that "the Congress recognizes
that 'each person had a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful
environment.' "" The House Conference Committee deleted this statement because it was uncertain of the "legal scope" of the Senate provision. 2 The court found this to be an indication that Congress specifically
did not intend for citizens to be able to use NEPA to redress private
injuries, and Noe could not therefore satisfy the second Cort criterion.
The Fifth Circuit determined that to imply a private right of action
would be inconsistent with the underlying purposes of NEPA, according
to the third Cort criterion. The underlying purpose of NEPA is to provide
decision makers with reasonably accurate information about the environmental impact of a specific project. "3The court reasoned that allowing a
private right of action whenever the ultimate result of a project differed
9. 644 F.2d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 1981).
10. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
11. CONFERENCE REPORT NO. 91-765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1969] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2751, 2768.
12. Id. at 2769.
13. Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 644 F.2d 434, 439 (5th Cir. 1981).
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from the EIS would lead those preparing the EIS to hedge their environmental predictions so as to insure that.the ultimate result would not be
worse than those predictions. This hedging would lead decision makers
to rely on inaccurate information, inconsistent with the informed decision
making required by NEPA.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit found that Noe's claim was essentially a cause
of action based on nuisance. The court noted that state law traditionally
controls nuisance claims. Thus, Noe's claim was one generally relegated
to state law, and failed to satisfy the fourth criterion in Cort.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court in Lewis had
overruled the Cannon and Cort standard that a plaintiff need only fall
into a class of persons a statute intends to protect to assert a private right
of action. The standard is now much stricter. Under Noe's interpretation
of current law, the four prong test in Cort is reduced to a two-tiered
analysis. A plaintiff must first show that Congress intended to create the
remedy sought, and only then may a court consider the other three Cort
factors.
The Fifth Circuit held that Congress intended NEPA to benefit the
general public, and that Congress had specifically rejected enforcement
by individuals through a private right of action under the act.
NANCY L. SIMMONS

